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Workplace health and gender among cotton workers in America and Britain, c. 1880s-
1940s* 
Dr Janet Greenlees 
Centre for the Social History of Health and Healthcare, Glasgow School for Business and Society, 
Glasgow Caledonian University Cowcaddens Road, Glasgow G4 0BA, UK 
This article clarifies the differences between occupational health and workplace health and reveals 
how the two overlap. It unravels a multi-layered narrative about textile workers’ understandings and 
experiences of ill-health at work in both America and Britain, utilizing a combination of oral histories, 
government documents, company and union records, and the trade press and identifying the 
multiple influences on debates about health at work. Contrary to current historiography, gender was 
only occasionally important to such discussions and among workers, gender did not significantly 
influence responses to unhealthy conditions. Understandings of, and responses to, workplace 
hazards were individual and related to knowledge about risk, ill-health and socio-economic factors. 
Consequently, workers’ understandings of and responses to the working environment reveals more 
convergence than divergence, suggesting a universal human response to the health risks of work 
that is not significantly influenced by national or industrial constraints, or gender.  
 
Cotton textile manufacturing was one of the few trades in both Britain and America where men and 
women could work alongside each other performing the same tasks for the same rates of pay and 
experiencing the same workplace health hazards. The two cotton industries, centred in Lancashire 
and New England, grew rapidly during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and 
subsequently declined, albeit at different rates. While studies of industrial strategy and production 
choices in cotton textile manufacturing regularly compare Britain and America and relate gender to 
costs and manual dexterity, industrial health has received limited comparative attention. Analyzing 
workers’ understandings of and responses to an unhealthy working environment provides a multi-
layered narrative involving official authorities, employers, medical advertising and workers, where 
gender’s importance depended on the context and discursive level. Working-class social realities 
influenced understandings of and responses to work-related health disorders, highlighting the 
similarity of the industrial experience across national and gender boundaries while also broadening 
understandings of occupational health. Many causes of ill-health relate to both working and living 
conditions. Hence, workplace health encompasses ill-health experienced at work but not necessarily 
caused by it and overlaps with occupational health, or ill health caused by specific work processes. 
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When men and women work alongside each other work-health relationships become 
entwined with broader histories of women’s health and work and occupational health and safety. 
British histories of women’s work-health relationship have followed broader histories of women’s 
health which argues that these issues rose to government interest tangentially through the 
development of maternal and child welfare policies in the early years of the twentieth century.1 
Industrial work histories have emphasized the dangers that work supposedly posed to women and 
their unborn children and how the British government introduced legislation to support a broader 
social agenda.2 The health of unmarried girls in the workplace – the future mothers of Britain – 
became a legislative priority.  
In America too, working-class women’s silence and maternalist ideology has dominated 
social policy and historical debates.3 In 1917, Alice Hamilton, physician, factory inspector, professor 
at the Harvard School of Public Health and the woman who created the field of industrial toxicology, 
shifted the existing legislative emphasis on purely protecting women’s health in factories to include 
hazards specific to reproductive health.4 This marked a shift in workplace health policies which 
reflected gender and class norms that had previously sought to limit the hours that women could 
work, partly so that they had the time and energy to be a good mother. Indeed, assumptions about 
motherhood greatly influenced women’s employment regulations,5 although policy implications 
have been prioritized over medical and scientific rationales for sex-specific laws.6 This article reveals 
how for both Lancashire and New England workers, social and environmental factors influenced 
their conception of work-related disorders and did not necessarily correspond with the middle-class, 
gendered, social and political priorities. 
In both countries, male experiences have dominated occupational health and safety 
discourses, with risk, cultures of masculinity and the politics of compensation recurrent themes.7  
Broad labour issues have overshadowed women’s experiences of occupational ill-health, particularly 
legislation and compensation for occupational diseases. Where gender has been addressed, this has 
been related to women’s behavior rather than occupation, overlooked due to wartime necessities, 
or the ill workers have been removed from the health debates.8 For cotton textile manufacturing, 
trade unions, legislation, medical politics, employers and their organizations, and sanitation have 
dominated debates,9 whereas women’s contributions to Trade Unions and indeed, the broader 
labour movement have been marginalized.10  Overall, British and American historiography about 
industrial illness and injury emphasize how capitalist neglect, official indifference and compensation 
took precedence over better health and safety standards - although the dynamics of each situation 
varied according to individual case studies.  
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This article examines the lesser known and often informal actions of individuals and groups 
of cotton operatives between the 1880s and 1940s when cotton cloth manufacturing in Lancashire 
and New England shifted from industrial growth to terminal decline after World War I. Throughout, 
operatives in both regions daily calculated the health risks associated with work and sought to 
address such risks when the boundary of what they deemed ‘acceptable’ working conditions was 
crossed. This boundary was fluid and only sometimes corresponded with trade union or political 
agendas. It was also entwined with the agendas of employers and official authorities and influenced 
by medical advertising. In both Lancashire and New England, workers’ agency in responding to 
hazards depended on the relevant constraints, personal, industrial and economic, including the state 
of the local labour market. When the need to earn a wage dominated priorities, responses included 
coping strategies. Utilizing a combination of workers’ papers, oral history collections, government 
documents and health reports, this article argues that the importance of gender in workplace health 
debates depended on the context and the dominant actors, but was never of central importance to 
workers. Instead, individuals and groups of workers’ daily determined the workplace health risks and 
responded accordingly. Risk was not determined by political and technical processes.11 Rather, in 
both regions, the social and economic context dominated workers’ decision-making and was not 
overtly gendered. 
Firstly, this article provides the health context of the cotton textile manufacturing regions of 
Lancashire and New England, with the textile mills of the American South excluded from analysis due 
to differences in industrial structure, labour and the timing of industrial change.12  The focus is the 
chronic health risks associated with cotton manufacturing, rather than accidents or compensation 
campaigns against life-threatening diseases, such as mule-spinners’ cancer and byssinosis – the 
respiratory disease whereby lung capacity is increasingly restricted after prolonged exposure to 
cotton dust. Because many chronic health problems attributable to textile work had multiple 
contributing agents, for example pneumonia, bronchitis and hearing loss, these were not high on the 
political reform agenda. Moreover, as with many health problems, individual and collective 
responses to the perceived workplace hazards varied depending on context. Secondly, it analyses 
the changing knowledge and expectations about work-health relationships and responsibilities, 
revealing contrasting understandings of workplace health between politicians, medical 
professionals, employers, workers and their representatives. Thirdly, it analyses the formal and 
informal strategies men and women cotton operatives utilized to address an unhealthy workplace, 
demonstrating the fluidity of the relationship between the working environment, health and gender. 
It reveals how throughout periods of industrial growth and subsequent decline, gender was more 
important to official authorities than it was to workers. The medical market, social reformers and 
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employers all utilized gender to suit their agendas. Unlike debates about industrial structure and 
strategy and union activism, workers’ understandings of and responses to the working environment 
in both countries reveals more convergence than divergence, where social and economic realities 
superseded national and industrial constraints, as well as gender. These contextual relationships at 
any given point in time determine health priorities and responses – both formal and informal. 
 
Textile regions, occupational health and responsibility 
Historically, the cotton industry has been labelled one of the pillars of industrialization in both 
Britain and America. In eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, the industry found its ideal 
location in Lancashire where the humid climate aided the fragile cotton fibres.  Towns such as 
Blackburn, Burnley, Bolton, Preston, Oldham and Nelson became synonymous with cotton textile 
manufacturing. Both men and women entered the mills, particularly in towns where cotton textile 
manufacturing dominated the local economy, including Blackburn and Burnley.  Towns with more 
diverse economies, including Bolton and Preston, provided greater employment opportunities for 
males, while textiles remained a higher paid choice for females. Cotton manufacturing expanded in a 
largely unregulated manner until the mid-nineteenth century when concerns grew about both mill 
works impact on operatives’ health and the high morbidity and mortality rates in many Lancashire 
towns.13 Even then, regulation was gradual and piecemeal and aimed more at restricting women’s 
labour than reforming conditions.  
In nineteenth century America, entrepreneurs found the abundant rivers and available 
female labour in New England ideal for cotton textile manufacturing. While isolated rural mills 
survived, the Massachusetts towns of Lowell, Holyoke, Fall River, New Bedford and Lawrence 
became thriving textile communities, employing men, women and sometimes children. Increased 
immigration during the latter years of the nineteenth century provided a ready supply of labour for 
the mills.  The low wages paid frequently required more than one family member to work in order to 
sustain the household, with over half the weavers of cotton goods in the United States being women 
and young people by 1905.14 Factory regulation in America was state specific and, similar to British 
legislation, Massachusetts legislation was gradual and piecemeal, prioritizing restricting the working 
hour’s women and children rather than industrial reform. Indeed, the concentration of cotton textile 
manufacturing in particular areas of the two countries created a regional component to occupational 
diseases and their regulation.15  In both countries, health and safety laws and the evolution of 
factory inspection were strongly shaped by mill experiences.16 Consequently, both mill operations 
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and the labour force were under regular observation by social reformers and politicians, whose 
priorities were influenced more by factors external to the mill, than internal. 
The health risks specific to mill work are well recorded, with causation both occupational 
and environmental. Long hours and the gruelling pace of work caused fatigue and migraines. Cotton 
and size dust caused or exacerbated multiple respiratory problems, including bronchitis, pneumonia 
and tuberculosis. Long-term exposure could also cause byssinosis, which acquired its medical name 
between 1885 and 1890. Dust was a particular problem in raw cotton processing, while weavers 
were concerned about both dust inhalation and contagious diseases through the use of the suction 
shuttle which required weavers to use their mouth to repeatedly draw thread through a tiny hole. 
Excessive heat and humidity contributed to high levels of respiratory illnesses, including pneumonia 
and bronchitis, and could cause rheumatism.  Poor lighting strained operatives’ eyes, while excessive 
machine noise could eventually cause deafness. And, from 1922, the carcinogenic lubricating oils 
used on spinning mules were a recognised problem in Lancashire.17 Indeed, the risks attributable to 
textile work were such that in 1914 the British government classified working in cotton factories a 
‘dangerous’ trade, despite the comparatively low rate of work injuries and fatalities compared with 
other industries.18 By World War I, the government had regulated many workplace hazards, yet 
employers repeatedly breeched the legislation. In 1903 alone, there were 569 recorded breaches of 
the Cotton Cloth Factories Act which regulated heat and humidity, in addition to those that went 
unrecorded.19 Moreover, the factory inspectorate was grossly understaffed and many workers had 
never known an inspector visit their firm.20 
With similar timing to Britain, in 1915, the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board labelled 
the cotton manufacturing industry the states’ second most dangerous, surpassed only by iron and 
steel.21 Despite Massachusetts’ progressive labour legislation and despite the Bureau of Labor’s 
studies about the dusty trades from 1903, preventive legislation that would have protected workers’ 
health and safety was absent other than the 1911 ban of the suction shuttle from public health 
concerns over tuberculosis.  While State and Federal officials readily noted the health risks 
attributable to textile work, Massachusetts legislation prioritized women’s and children’s working 
hours (1874), employer’s liability for accidents (1887), and Workers’ Compensation (1912).  Similar 
to in Lancashire, legislative enforcement was limited, with factory inspections few and the 
department understaffed and underfunded. While occupational legislation secured limited factory 




Cotton manufacturers blamed workers for accidents and workplace ill-health. In 1920, the 
Textile World Journal neatly summarized the Massachusetts’ employers’ arguments that had been 
reiterated in testimony to state inquiries over the previous fifty years and which government officials 
largely seem to have accepted. 
Textile workers are apt to be careless, ignorant of the dangers of infection and disease, 
not always cleanly, and many of the alien rather prefer to herd together in their 
habitations.  They have borne the ill effects of accident and sickness with a stoicism 
handed down through several generations.  They have accepted these ills as the 
customary lot of their class, without much thought that they could be alleviated, and 
without dreaming that in large measure they might be eliminated.22 
Blaming the victim fit the broader ideology of the American legal system through the first two 
decades of the twentieth century which held workers accountable for accidents and acute diseases 
under an assumption of risk.  Yet consensus about responsibility was lacking. Some Progressive Era 
employers made the work-health connection, recognizing the production benefits from improved 
working conditions and linking responsibility with profits, while others did not.  
Lancashire employers also blamed workers for their own ill health, bemoaning in 1914 that: 
“How is it that the factory is always denounced as the only cause of sickness? Overcrowded housing, 
careless dietary, and habits that make for ill-health never seem to enter the calculations of the 
[Trade Union] officials.”23 Responsibility for ill-health was placed on the workers, their lifestyles, 
dietary choices and carelessness.   
How much, for instance, have the conditions of the home got to do with sickness, 
especially the almost always closed bedroom windows. How much is a careless system 
of dietary responsible for illness? And how much carelessness in other matters that 
need not be specifically indicated?24  
To employers, health problems were the fault and prevention the responsibility of workers. 
Nevertheless, in both Lancashire and Massachusetts, without firm workplace legislation variations in 
working conditions between firms remained as employers sought to maximize production. 
For their part, workers and their unions needed to balance the health risks attributable to 
work with those of not working – particularly no income. Yet while documentary and some oral 
testimony supports Elizabeth Roberts idea of a ‘social calm’ in Lancashire whereby people accepted 
their lot, including poverty and poor conditions and which is reflected in the absence of class 
protest,25 this does not mean operatives were always deferential and submissive or that they left 
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industrial health to their unions. Similarly, Mary Blewett has argued that in Massachusetts, the 
female mill workers of Lowell accepted their lot as working-class children, with all that it entailed, 
from leaving school at a young age to many years in the mills.26 Yet while health did not always 
dominate workers’ priorities, this should not imply worker passivity. Rather, this article suggests that 
workers’ priorities were fluid and dependent on personal and industrial circumstances, particularly 
because many health issues related to both the working and living environment. 
 
Biomedical knowledge and expectations about health at work 
From the late nineteenth century, formal medical knowledge about the workplace causes of ill-
health grew alongside developments in biomedicine, while health expectations in mill communities 
were tempered by living conditions. Levels of understanding about different workplace diseases 
varied, but in the latter decades of the nineteenth century the leading fear in both Lancashire and 
Massachusetts was tuberculosis. The medical community raised concerns about the spread of TB 
into the factory before medical knowledge differentiated byssinosis and tuberculosis. It was 1902 
before the British physician Thomas Oliver recognized byssinosis as one of the four recognized types 
of pneumoconiosis, or industrial lung diseases.27 Nevertheless, distinguishing between industrial and 
contagious respiratory illnesses remained difficult well into the twentieth century, particularly 
byssinosis and bronchitis. It was the mid-1950s before the British physician, Richard Shilling, made 
significant progress in separating the two and 1969 before the American medical community 
acknowledged that byssinosis was indeed, a disease.28  
A different trajectory of understanding followed industrial deafness. In 1911, the 
Massachusetts’ legislature acknowledged that certain occupations associated with loud noises 
produced permanent injury to the ear, including weaving. Yet deafness was not considered the 
serious handicap for weavers that it was for other occupations. Rather, weavers’ deafness was 
merely an inconvenience.29 It was the 1920s before audiometric techniques were developed and 
1942 before a hearing impairment formula was developed and accepted by the American Medical 
Association.30  Hence, until the 1940s, medical consensus was lacking about the boundary between 
hearing loss and deafness, as well as pinpointing the cause.31  With similar timing, in the 1930s, the 
British government’s Industrial Health Research Board conducted experiments about the effects of 
excessive noise on weavers’ efficiency, concluding in 1935, that:  
it may be doubted whether complete immunity from the inimical effects of 
excessive noise can ever be acquired so long as normal hearing is retained, and that 
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the development of partial deafness appears to be the only effective protection 
which the individual can acquire.32  
The following year, the British Medical Journal further deflected attention about hearing loss from 
the factory, arguing that it was ‘by no means easy to define precisely the working conditions which 
are in themselves calculated to produce partial or total deafness in a given time.’33  Clearly, well into 
the twentieth century, both governments and medical communities in Britain and the United States 
were unable or unwilling to link specific health problems to work, making easier employers’ ability to 
ignore the working environment. Consequently, operatives lacked a formal, medical framework to 
which to attach any physical symptoms they believed were caused by occupation. Instead, workers’ 
expectations and knowledge about the working environment was based on a personal model of 
illness, not a medical model, where many health issues translated to both working and living 
conditions. 
While experiences of illness are individual, mill workers noted similarities of symptoms and 
the work-health connection. However, ill-educated workers focused on their immediate health and 
did not foresee long-term health hazards from mill work.  In the 1840s Lowell operatives complained 
to family and friends how the dust and noise of the mills made them feel unwell.34  By 1910, the 
majority of operative admissions to the Lowell Corporation Hospital, owned by the textile 
employers’, were for respiratory problems.35  In the 1920s and 1930s, mill workers still noted how 
inhaling textile dust made their breathing ‘uncomfortable’ but did not understand the physiological 
implications.  Some workers stoically commented that ‘you get used to it (the dust)’,36 while others 
identified a work-health connection. For example, Valentine Chartrand, who spent over twenty years 
working in the Lowell mills from World War I noted, “Because in the winter the windows are all 
closed, you know? And all you get is that lint flying around.  And you breathe a lot of that.  And I 
always had a feeling that wasn’t good for your lungs….”37  Carder and dye house worker, Sydney 
Muskowitz, who entered the Merrimack Mills of Lowell in 1937, noted that “And before I got hired, I 
was told, keep your eyes open, ears open, and your mouth shut [because of the dust and dirt]. The 
superintendent says….That [carding] is the most miserable, hottest, dangerous job I ever had.” Thirty 
years later, Muskowitz found that, “I couldn’t breathe, getting dizzy. Pains in the chest…. I believe it 
was the heat and the dust that irritated my heart.”38  He had never heard of byssinosis, possibly 
because there were few cases of byssinosis in New England.39  Yet despite lacking the medical 
language, both male and female operatives clearly recognized the work-health relationship between 
dust and respiratory problems, but not the longer-term health consequences until too late.  
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In the mid-twentieth century, Lancashire mill workers knowledge remained limited about 
biomedical and legislative developments concerning dust inhalation, its regulation and the term 
byssinosis. They did not realize the potential for cotton dust to permanently damage health.  For 
example, Mona Morgan worked in the cardroom between the 1930s and 1970s and when 
interviewed, suffered from byssinosis. She claimed that: “If anyone would have told me this would 
happen, I wouldn’t have gone in.”40 Fellow byssinosis sufferer and ring room worker between the 
1940s and 1980s, Ethel Fielding noted, “We were never told anything like that. You never dreamt of 
work hazards.”41 Cardroom worker May Mitchell, employed in the 1930s and 1940s, confirmed that 
she had “Never heard the word [byssinosis], never heard the word til years after come out of 
t’mill.”42  Yet from before the Great War, trade union campaigns fought to secure compensation for 
male byssinosis sufferers, succeeding in 1941, suggesting that some men were aware of the health 
impact from long-term dust exposure. Indeed, the British discourse of byssinosis was predominantly 
male, comprising trade unions, medics and government officials, not operatives.43  While byssinosis 
compensation was extended to women from 1948, for years, ignorance of the disease and the law 
remained amongst women. Gendered understandings of the dust-disease relationship translated to 
unions and compensation, not reform or education.  
Mill-workers could not avoid the deafening noise of machines. Yet, well into the twentieth 
century they remained unaware of the long term effects of exposure and did not consider industrial 
noise ‘dangerous’.44  Massachusetts mill worker Rene Desjardins noted that: “At that time, nobody 
knew anything about that” (industrial deafness),45 while Mabel Mangan remembered that “The 
noise would drive you out of your mind.… but we didn’t know it could hurt you.”46  Instead, the 
weavers compensated for hearing loss by either shouting directly into another’s ear or by 
communicating with their hands in a crude type of sign language.47  Twentieth century Lancashire 
mill workers also complained about the noise. George Wrigley remembered how “The noise was 
horrendous. But, like anything else when you’re young, you just take it. It’s your job. You’ve gone 
into it, get on with it.”48 Weaver Marjory Shaw remembered that:  
Oh, it was very noisy. But I knew that. Ahh, I knew it was noisy, but all the family had 
gone weaving, so I thought, well, it’s in the blood. Foolish, you know. Very foolish, 
but there it is. And, ah, it didn’t bother me. Cause everybody was talking with yer 
lips, you know, lip reading, and you could have a conversation and nobody would 
know what you were talkin’, only you who were eye to eye.49   
Lancashire weavers were reputed for their lip-reading abilities, which enabled them to 
communicate. Yet their denial of potential deafness related to hearing loss being gradual. They could 
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still communicate and friends and neighbours did not react to it. Throughout both regions, deafness 
was a socially accepted problem for men and women that could be overcome and one in which 
science, society, labour and politics had little interest. 
While operatives in both regions recognized that certain aspects of millwork made them feel 
unwell, the social context of the living environment tempered their understandings and expectations 
of health. Overcrowding, poverty and poor sanitation featured in the textile towns of both 
Lancashire and New England. While direct comparisons are difficult, it is probable that the damp, 
stone houses of Lancashire were unhealthier than the wooden homes of New England.  Even then, 
the public health initiatives and agendas of different Lancashire town councils and their Medical 
Officers of Health suggest considerable variations in the living and working conditions between 
communities.50 So too in Massachusetts, did living and working conditions vary within and between 
communities, with Fall River living conditions reputedly some of the worst; rivaling those in parts of 
Lancashire.51  Hence, within each region, and indeed, each town, the importance of both the living 
and working environment to the public health agenda fluctuated, making difficult any unified 
campaigns for workplace health reform.  
Social factors meant that Lancashire women’s health was frequently weaker than men’s, 
more so than their New England counterparts and excluding the universal impact of pregnancy. 
American wages were higher than those in Lancashire. Nevertheless, diet, the quantity and quality of 
food varied between towns. Archaeological digs in Lowell revealed that skilled workers on higher 
pay, unsurprisingly, were more likely to have better quality food than unskilled workers.  Yet, the 
unskilled workers residing in Lowell boardinghouses had sufficient food and did not note gender 
differences in diet, quantity or quality. During the textile recession of the 1920s and 1930s, families 
strove to ensure ‘three squares a day’ for all members.52  In contrast, late-nineteenth century Fall 
River workers had poor diets in both quality and quantity, but the vital contribution of multiple 
family members to the household budget required all to have a fair share of the available food.53  
While family circumstance determined whether American women needed to enter the paid labour 
force on a short-term, intermittent or long-term basis, society acknowledged women as essential 
contributors to the economy.  In contrast, Lancashire diets were generally more meager than those 
in New England with cheap, filling foods rather than nutrition being the priority.54  When times were 
hard, women and young girls often had the smallest portion at family mealtimes, lowering their 
resistance to disease55 and making more difficult the long days in the mills. Through the mid-
twentieth century, social reformers ignored economic realities and prioritized morality, a male-
breadwinner and women’s primary role being that of mother and homemaker. These factors, 
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combined with the longer manufacturing decline than in New England, suggest that Lancashire 
women textile workers may have been consistently physically weaker than both their American 
counterparts and their male colleagues in their ability to cope with an unhealthy workplace. 
Variations aside, urban living conditions in both countries were bleak, with high mortality and 
morbidity rates, making it unsurprising that textile operatives’ tolerated some discomfort in the 
factory working environment.  
Textile workers’ expectations about health and the working environment were continuously 
entwined with social realities. In a life of low wages and substandard housing, with a need to earn 
money and limited employment opportunities, both Lancashire and Massachusetts textile workers 
accepted certain health risks attributable to the workplace, including dust, accidents and noise. Yet 
both men and women operatives did not expect these risks to have long-term health consequences 
extending outside the factory walls. Such dissonance between means and ends, responsibilities and 
understandings of workplace hazards, left mill workers to daily address what they understood to be 
the immediate health risks attributable to work, rather than seeking prevention of long-term health 
conditions. 
 
Operatives’ responses to workplace health hazards  
Cotton operatives’ responses to what they perceived were the health risks of work were entwined 
with relationships with their trade unions, employers and governments and influenced by local 
factors, including available medicines. Moreover, workers’ attitudes and reactions to an unhealthy 
working environment cannot be pigeonholed. Rather, they reveal the multiple attitudes and 
methods workers adopted to address the workplace health risks, which only grew during the 
interwar recession as production was speeded up on outdated machines, increasing levels of noise 
and fatigue.56  Throughout, coping strategies were entwined with collective action, including 
spontaneous protests and strikes, both with and without Trade Union support. At the same time, 
operatives supported Union reform campaigns.  What emerges is a universal picture of cotton 
operatives who were consistently concerned about the impact poor working conditions had on their 
immediate health, alongside a gendered commonality of experience and response. The exception is 
women retaining their traditional familial role as healthcare provider. Individually and collectively 
workers dealt with whatever life threw at them, rather than merely accepting it, as Hallet, et al., 
have argued.57  
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The working environment was firm specific which prevented sustained, widespread action 
for reform. Individual firms earned reputations for their working conditions, making some firms 
more desirable places to work than others. In the 1880s, the Granite Mills in Fall River began 
improving their factory environment by tackling the high heat and humidity levels. The firm 
continued investing in new technologies into the 1920s. While some new machines met legislative 
requirements, they also earned the firm a good reputation.58 So too, did the Merrimack, Hamilton 
and Bunting Mills in Lowell invest in more modern technologies. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, these employers recognized the production benefits that translated from reforming the mill 
environment to improving the health of their workforce, while operatives found these firms more 
desirable places to work.59 In contrast, in 1932, the fire insurance company identified the Boott Mills 
of Lowell as the dirtiest and dustiest firm in the American textile industry. The Boott also ignored 
legislation about humidity, child labour and sanitation. Consequently, when possible, Boott 
operatives sought employment elsewhere.60 In Lancashire too, mill workers regularly switched 
employers when dissatisfied with conditions.61 Oldham operatives remembered how the working 
environment in the Bee and Maple Mills was better than at the Borough or Monarch Mills, being 
cleaner and having newer technology that minimized atmospheric dust.62 These employers 
recognized the production benefits of technological investment, while workers reaped the health 
benefits.  
In both countries, women workers were more likely than men to switch jobs or firms 
because they were denied access to more highly skilled, better paying jobs like loom fixing.  Equally, 
a poor working environment hastened some operatives’ exit from the textile labour market.63  In 
New England, cotton manufacturing left the region more rapidly than in Lancashire and where in 
some towns, employment options grew during the twentieth century. From the 1940s, light industry 
and electronics firms moved into Lowell, providing jobs with better pay and conditions than the 
mills, especially for women.  Nevertheless, in both regions the regular switching of firms and jobs 
provided women with a sense of empowerment in a powerless environment because the mills 
offered little opportunity for either advancement or consistent employment.  Switching employers 
demonstrated individual worker agency, yet the form of expression remained locally determined. 
Workers developed coping strategies when switching employers was not possible, when the 
risk of not working was greater than the health risks of working, or when the health risks associated 
with work were within the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ risk.  Although varied, strategies held 
industrial commonalities in Lancashire and New England.  For example, dust inhalation caused 
workers to cough and sometimes vomit.  To try and remove the dust from their mouth and lungs, 
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workers spat.64  When this did not work, well into the twentieth century both men and women 
chewed tobacco to induce coughing to try and clear the airways.65  Such actions had no direct effect 
on employers’ technological choices, but elicited both social and political responses. Social reformers 
considered ‘spitting’ a disgusting habit, particularly by women; while early twentieth century public 
health officials argued that spitting spread disease.66 The emphasis on morality and contagion 
provided no social or professional support for workers needing causational reforms from employers. 
To workers, spitting served an immediate, practical, preventive health function.  
The public moral priority, combined with legislative indifference, led operatives in both 
countries to turn to kinship and friendship networks and ‘wise women’ for advice on managing the ill 
effects of work, while utilizing patent medicines to alleviate discomfort.67 Indeed, the multiple health 
problems, combined with often a family labour force, made cotton regions a ready market for patent 
medicines. It is unsurprising that two of the leading patent medicines, Beechams in Britain and 
Father John’s Medicine in America, were developed in the textile regions. By the 1920s, these firms 
had clearly identified women as the core purchasers of medicine and targeted her in advertising 
family remedies.68 As both victims of occupational maladies and in charge of the household health, 
women provided a dual market for patent medicines. 
Late nineteenth and twentieth century Beecham’s adverts claimed that their pills cured 
consumption, fatigue and women’s problems. In 1918, Beecham’s advertised in the operatives’ 
newspaper, the Cotton Factory Times, that Beecham’s Pills were designed for ‘Weary Women 
Workers’. They could prevent or cure fatigue.69 While initially advertised as a cure-all, Beecham’s 
pills also had a positive effect on the digestive system,70 which may well have appealed to operatives 
working in dusty environments. Despite the growing authority of biomedicine in the twentieth 
century, Lancashire workers continued utilizing traditional and patent medicines, herbal remedies, 
and consulting wise women.71  Women learned about such remedies in the mills from listening to 
conversations of older women or directly seeking their advice in health matters.72   
New England mill workers similarly used kinship, friendship and workplace networks for 
health advice, with women central to such care networks. Yet the multi-ethnic composition of the 
textile workforce meant makers of patent medicines adopted different marketing strategies to in 
Lancashire, although women remained the target customer. New immigrants reconstructed their 
ethnic support networks and traditions from their home country,73 with many coming from Catholic 
traditions, including French Canadians, Irish and Southern Europeans.  Perhaps the most famous 
patent medicine, Father John’s Medicine was named after the Lowell priest, Father John O’Brien in 
1855. It targeted Catholic families with Father John’s personal, product endorsement. Father John’s 
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Medicine was widely available and claimed to cure: “consumption, grip, croup, whooping cough, and 
other diseases of the throat.”  It was a “A fine tonic: Good for the whole family.”74 Unlike another 
well-known New England patent medicine, Lydia Pinkham’s vegetable compound, which in 1906 was 
found to contain 15 per cent alcohol, Father John’s medicine contained no alcohol. Initially 
comprising cod liver oil, with liquorice flavouring, after fifty years, the ingredients remained virtually 
the same.  Hence, the makers of patent medicines in the British and American textile regions 
recognized a burgeoning market with mill workers, but marked their product within the local gender 
context.  
Another component of the operatives’ mixed economy of healthcare was that offered by 
employers. Some employers increasingly recognized the production benefits from onsite welfare, in 
part because it could prevent workers from going home. The 1916 British Factory Act mandated a 
sick room where workers could rest and return to work when well.  By the 1950s, Lancashire 
workers regularly utilized certain company health initiatives. Welfare Officers, who were 
occupational nurses or first aiders, provided workers with aspirins or a chance to rest in the sick 
room. They also supported operatives’ with cases to go home sick.  Yet if a firm did not have a 
Welfare Officer, or if operatives chose to ignore her advice, sick operatives continued to go home – 
to the employers’ complaints.75  The Welfare Officers’ retained their autonomy and resisted 
management aims for them to serve the employers, rather than the workers. Although employed to 
support all workers, Welfare Officers particularly catered to women. They allowed tired women to 
rest, particularly if they had their periods, or listened to domestic troubles, providing a cup of tea 
and sympathy rather than rushing operatives back to work.76 For minor illnesses and fatigue, 
Welfare Officers bridged the gap between self-help and employer control. Hence, Lancashire 
operatives expanded their healthcare networks to take advantage of the free healthcare provided, 
including that offered by employers, while retaining the autonomy of individual choice.  
American textile employers also increasingly sought to manage workers’ ill health, 
particularly after a 1929 U.S. Department of Labor investigation into mill workers’ absences revealed 
high absentee rates due to illness and accidents, home duties and personal reasons, especially by 
women who were both workers and the primary care-givers.77 The Lowell employers were unique 
because they operated a hospital between 1840 and 1930 to attend workers’ injuries and illnesses, 
but with limited success. Workers preferred to manage their own health and avoided the employers’ 
hospital when possible.78 Starting in the interwar years, some employers introduced company nurses 
to provide minor health services and to determine whether individuals were sick enough to leave. 
Previously, this had been the managers’ decision.79  While little is known about company nurses, 
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Lawrence operatives remembered them as being kind and resourceful. They dressed wounds, 
treated burns and advised on pregnancy.80  While company nurses were associated with the 
employer and consulted with caution, generally, mill hands responded favourably to them and the 
free, professional health advice they provided.81  Nevertheless, similar to their Lancashire 
counterparts, Massachusetts working-class mill operatives retained autonomy by seeking health 
advice from whomever they wished.  
Being ill was costly because time off work was unpaid. Hence, cooperative networks played 
an important role in mill workers management of ill-health. In fact, cooperation was essential for 
managing the heat, dust, humidity and pace of work. Lancashire and New England operatives 
watched co-workers machines to enable breaks. They helped struggling colleagues, for example, to 
lift something heavy, while neighbouring workers might help an individual keep up when sick or 
pregnant. Twentieth century mill worker Jean Rouses remembered how in Lowell: “We took care of 
one another. Sometimes you’d say, Would you watch my frame? And you’d take off. They’d watch it. 
It was pretty good.”82  Similarly, Lancashire mill worker Elsie Hansford remembered how ‘‘We always 
used to help one another.”83  Such informal networks secure little written documentation, yet 
collectively and individually, for short periods, they allowed ill workers to keep earning when unable 
to afford time off. Mill managers seemingly accepted such arrangements because workers retained 
their jobs, possibly because production was not impeded. Indeed, there is no consistent narrative 
surrounding how mill workers coped with an unhealthy workplace or the relationship between 
workers, employers and health. Managing health at work was simply part of working life. It was 
primarily informal and not overtly gendered. Rather, gender was entwined with working-class health 
through custom, including women being responsible for family health care. Co-operation was 
universal. 
Nevertheless, if working conditions became unbearable, operatives were not averse to 
collective action. Accounts of collective action happening outside those recognised by trade unions 
paralleled individual responses.  New England newspapers record mills voluntarily closing for a few 
days in the summer due to the heat, as well as operatives walking out and effectively shutting the 
mills when they considered the weather too hot for work, to take advantage of berry picking season, 
or to go fishing.84 In 1873, women operatives walked out of the Lawrence Mills in Lowell because of 
poor ventilation.85  Unable to assert their authority and prevent walkouts, or because of a local 
labour shortage, employers seem to have accepted these informal disruptions because the 
newspapers do not mention workers being dismissed. More formally, in 1903 and again in 1912, 
Lowell mill workers struck for higher wages and “better, cleaner and healthier conditions in the city 
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of Lowell”.86  While strikes and walkouts were mostly mill specific and returned only limited success, 
they reveal how working-class cooperation prioritized dignity, autonomy, conditions and wages. In 
protest, as on the shop floor, women worked alongside men to organize strikes and as participants. 
In fact, of the recorded, spontaneous walkouts in New England, most were started and led by 
women, including the 1912 strike.87 While this does not imply that men were less interested than 
women in working conditions, it highlights the importance of working conditions to women and their 
labour leadership in this area. Despite the lack of a strong trade union tradition in New England, 
working-class collaboration strove to improve industrial life. 
In Lancashire, male trade union activity and government priorities have overshadowed 
spontaneous and non-union collective action about the working environment.88 White’s study of 
Lancashire Textile Workers’ strikes between 1910 and 1914 found that of 130 weavers’ strikes, 24 or 
18 percent, related to undefined working conditions.89  Yet throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, additional, unofficial action went unrecorded in White’s union and government sources.  
Male and female operatives walked out when managers used bad language, including at Marsden in 
1900 and Blackburn in 1925,90 or when the moisture was excessive, including in 1895 in Burnley and 
Padiham and in 1913, in both Blackburn and Burnley.91  While a local labour shortage minimized the 
long-term risks of such action, the state of the local labour market was not always relevant. When 
the humidity became too oppressive, workers sometimes left anyway, including at Burnley in 1900 
and Preston in the 1930s.92  Impromptu strikes were also staged at mills that were too cold or if 
temperatures were below that required by the Factory Acts, such as in Nelson, Oldham and Burnley 
in 1918.93  Indeed, working conditions were important to male and female workers and their 
representatives. In 1910, the Blackburn and District Power-Loom Weavers’, Winders’ & Warpers’ 
Association argued that weavers’: 
…are even willing, to receive less wages if they can bring about the abolition of 
artificial humidity. That to our minds gives us the possibility of arriving at only one 
conclusion, namely, that the system is considered and believed to be so injurious to 
their health that the weavers are prepared to face other difficulties rather than carry 
on their vocation under its operation.94    
While Lancashire mill workers accepted that working conditions were not always ideal, such non-
gendered collective action to improve working conditions helps counter the argument that the 
Lancashire working-class stoically accepted their lot95 and highlights workers’ proactive efforts to 
improve working conditions, with and without union support. Nevertheless, the localized nature of 
such protests secured little national political attention.  
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During the interwar years when the textile industries began their long decline, British 
government investigations into the effect of mill conditions on operatives’ health increased. In 1925, 
an Industrial Fatigue Research Board Report revealed no significant difference in the morbidity rates 
of weavers who worked in sheds that used steam and those that did not. Shortly afterwards, Home 
Office Reports in 1927 and 1928 effectively ‘confirmed’ that humidity did not pose a risk to workers’ 
health.96  With similar timing, the workers’ newspaper, the Cotton Factory Times, placed greater 
responsibility on operatives for their own health, hinting at the unions shifting priorities to wages 
and jobs.97 Indeed, both government and the unions prioritized industrial survival over workers’ 
health. When a 1935 Industrial Health Research Board investigation revealed that the noise in 
weaving sheds seriously impaired hearing and impeded production, the government accepted the 
employers’ argument that industrial reforms were prohibitively expensive.98 The government 
demonstrated a similar disinterest in complaints about eyestrain and fatigue and formally ignored 
workplace health by not including an occupational health service in the original mandate for the 
National Health Service (NHS).99   
Despite industrial decline and political disinterest, Lancashire workers continued their 
sporadic collective action against unhealthy conditions. For example, in August 1932, 150 weavers at 
Clover Mill in Nelson struck, claiming that the excessive use of steam caused numerous cases of 
rheumatism.  The Nelson Weavers’ Association provided little support other than claiming “that the 
people who work in that atmosphere are the best judges.”100 Instead, the Association prioritized an 
ongoing wage-battle with employers, the outcome of which held wider implications for all 
Lancashire weavers.101 The growing government and trade union apathy towards the working 
environment helps explain the decline in recorded collective action and the preference for individual 
strategies and cooperative networks for managing the ill-effects of work. Mill workers still switched 
employers or walked out. They still spat and self- medicated. After the 1948 introduction of the NHS, 
operatives incorporated state healthcare into their network, including Welfare Officers and NHS 
doctors. While outside the scope of this article, such initiatives began replacing rather than 
paralleling collective action. Nevertheless, a constant through the years of industrial growth and 
decline in both Lancashire and New England was the commonality of working-class experiences of 
workplace ill health and responses to it. Addressing the consequences of industrialization was a class 
issue, not a gendered one, with operatives left to address the working environment themselves. The 




Both social policy and historical arguments suggest that many western nations were headed towards 
a paternalistic welfare state in the twentieth century, seeking to aid industrial workers and their 
dependents, with America heading towards a pioneering maternalist welfare state.102  The 
patriarchal discourse of gender comprised campaigns to either ‘protect’ women or to remove them 
from the workplace.103  This paper provides a parallel, multi-layered narrative about working-class 
experiences of health at work and the associated role of gender.  It reveals how the social, political 
and economic contexts affected both the conception of work-related ill-health and responses to 
them. Gender only entered the working-class experience because women were responsible for the 
household health, which explains why medical advertising targeted women. Ultimately, however, 
workers were left to address working conditions as they saw fit. As McIvor and Johnston found with 
British coal miners facing dusty conditions, mill workers in both countries were pragmatic and 
realistic.104  How operatives responded to conditions related to understandings of the causes of ill-
health, local and individual circumstances. This article has shown how British and American 
operatives’ daily management of unhealthy working conditions suggests a commonality of textile 
workers’ experience of workplace health which incorporates working and living conditions. Here, 
occupational health overlapped with workplace health. These understandings were framed by the 
broader social and economic conditions. 
This multi-layered synthesis of medical, business and labour history highlights the 
commonality of the industrial experience and how this overshadowed social and political 
perceptions of gender. While it supports Dembe’s argument that medical knowledge is a contested 
terrain and occupational diseases are socially constructed, it also reveals how occupational health is 
entwined with broader workplace health and living conditions.105 If we are to fully understand the 
intricate and changing relationship between health, work and gender, further studies are needed 
about the complex relationship between health in the living and working environment and working-
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